619 To the south of Tay is the Jubur tribe. This tribe is composed
241 of two branches, the Jubur of Jagjag concentrated around Tal Brak
233 and south to Hassaleh, and the Jubur of the Khabur from north of Hassakeh to Fadghami. The Jagjag Jubur have taken to growing cereals besides grazing, but the Khabur Jubur find little employment in agriculture because their area is arid and those who do not work on irrigated lands are mostly sheep grazers.

619 Another big tribe migrating between the Euphrates and Jazirah
241 is the Baggaret el Jabal. This tribe is completely nomad. It spends
233 the winter in the plans toward Deir Ezzor and migrates in the summer to Jabal Abdel Aziz. It used to cross the Khabur to graze in
121 Jazirah but a dispute arose with Shammar Ezzor in 1949 over the ownership of some villages below Derbassiya, and supported by the Kurds, Shammar was able to drive Baggara back across the Khabur.

241 Of these tribes mentioned, Shammar is still mostly nomadic
621 though its lands in the north are good for agriculture. The Tay tribe is completely sedentary, Jubur Jagjag have become mostly sedentary, while Jubur Khabur are in a measure nomads because of the unsuitability of their lands, and the Baggara are completely nomads.

619 In tribal politics, Shammar stands alone. Tay and the Jubur
721 are traditional allies against Shammar. The Baggara are enemies of Shammar and friendly to Jubur. Raids of Shammar on Jubur are frequent especially in the region of Fadghami. The last big conflict between Shammar and Tay occurred in 1951 when over a hundred persons from the two parties were killed in a fight over the ownership of the lands south of the Rad.

6221 The Bedouin Sheiks of the different Arab tribes formerly re-
6621 ceived money grants from the Ottoman Government under the guise of expenses for the maintenance of law and order in their regions. These grants were in essence bribes to keep the Sheiks quiet. Unfortunately, the French continued this system, and relied on the Sheiks to control the tribesmen by giving the Sheik a fixed annual salary, each according to his importance. In this way, the Government implicitly renounced its right to deal directly with the individual Bedouin and dealt with him only through his Sheik.

This situation, which lasted until about a year ago, strengthened the Sheik enormously in the eyes of his tribesmen, and the Sheik
622 invariably exploited the situation to his personal benefit. Thus,
425 in the Bedouin districts of Jazirah, the rapid development and
427

But proofs of their increase are the hundreds of new villages tilled by Kurds and built by them in the regions of Kubur el Bid, Amuda, and Derbassiya.

The Kurds like the Arabs, follow a tribal organization. Starting from the east, the Koshar tribe, mostly nomadic but recently turning to agriculture, dominates Jazirat ibn Amr, i.e., the region of Deink and Ain Diwar. The Koshar border Shammar on the south and they are on fighting terms because Nayefz Pasha, chief of the Koshar, killed the brother of Dham, chief of Shammar. Next to the west is the Shitiya tribe around Kubur el Bid. This tribe is old in the region. Its members are Arab in their dress and, in contrast with all the other Kurdish tribes, they speak Arabic as well as Kurdish. [illegible] west of Shammar and more within the Tay region but its relations with both are friendly.

Qamishli, which is a Tay region, includes villages of the Pinar Ali tribe. But west of Qamishli comes a solid bloc of 100% Kurdish villages extending for more than sixty kilometers and reaching to the west of Dirbassiya practically uninterrupted by any Arab village. This area is undoubtedly one of the most fertile of Jazirah. Within it, the Dakkuriya tribe is centered around Amuda, then follow the Kikiya around Dirbassiya, and the Milliya from Dirbassiya to Ras el Ain.

The Kurds are considered very good farmers. They plow and plant with mules but they rent combines for the harvest. This is because they have learned that combine harvest is more economical. The Kurd is also greatly praised for his character. He is truthful, honest, and upright in his dealings. He keeps his word and the merchants of the Jazir trust him completely. He is also clean in his home and in his dress, and though Bedouins reproach him for not being generous in his house, his standard of living is higher than the Bedouin and his villages are much cleaner.

The Kurds owe allegiance to their Agha who takes the place of the Bedouin Sheik. But this relationship is weaker than is the case of the Bedouins. The successive Governments did not give the Agha grants of money or similar authority over his tribesmen in the manner of the Sheik. The Kurds were considered from the start sedentary people subject directly to Government laws. That is why most of the Kurds own and till their lands in their own right.

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond; once, and most memorably, from Arabia; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

621 241 penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

619 721 221 The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

621 427 651 423 In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

621 423 The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power

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between the oppression exercised in the name of democracy and that exercised in the name of Fascism. This tendency was encouraged by the efforts of the competing propaganda services, each of which purported to unmask the true face of the other party. Moreover, painful memories remained of the conduct of the Allies during the last war. The Arabs had trusted to Allied promises then and had been, as they saw it, cheated. They were therefore sceptical, and afraid to give their full trust to either side. Still more bitter were the memories of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war: the cession of Alexandretta, the failure to ratify the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties, and above all the Arab revolt in Palestine, which had aroused intense feeling throughout Arab Asia, and had done more than anything else to alienate the Arabs from the Allied Powers.

These and other currents of political feeling existed beneath the surface, but there was little overt political activity during the first nine months of the war. The High Commissioner and the Syrian and Lebanese authorities confined themselves mainly to measures of administrative reform and economic and financial control; the safeguarding of the food supply against the activities of hoarders and profiteers was their constant preoccupation. In external affairs one source of anxiety was removed by the conclusion in November, 1939, of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact, and in March, 1940, of a Turco-Syrian Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. But a new anxiety grew up, with the German offensive on the Western front in May, 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war in June; it reflected itself in the additional measures of precaution taken in the Mandated Territories.

2

After the capitulation of France there was some doubt about the attitude which the French authorities in the Levant would adopt. It was resolved by the order of the day issued on June 27th by General Mittelhauser, who had succeeded Weygand after the latter had been recalled to take command of the Allied Forces in France. 'According to the terms of the French armistice', he announced, 'there will be no change in the status of the Mandated Territories. Consequently, the cessation of hostilities has been ordered. The French flag

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72/64 will continue to be flown in these territories, and France will carry on her mission in the Levant.'

The cessation of hostilities had the gravest effect upon the Allied position in the Middle East, and occasioned great anxiety to the British Government. At the beginning of July the Foreign Office issued the following statement:

'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand that General Mittelhauser, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant, has stated that hostilities have ceased in Syria. His Majesty's Government assume that this does not mean that if Germany or Italy sought to occupy Syria or the Lebanon and were to try to do so in the face of British command of the sea, no attempt would be made by the French forces to oppose them. In order, however, to set at rest doubts which may be felt in any quarter, His Majesty's Government declare that they could not allow Syria or the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile Power or to be used as a base for attacks upon those countries in the Middle East which they are pledged to defend, or to become the scene of such disorder as to constitute a danger to those countries.

'They therefore hold themselves free to take whatever measures they may in such circumstances consider necessary in their own interests. Any action which they may hereafter be obliged to take in fulfilment of this declaration will be entirely without prejudice to the future status of the territories now under French Mandate.'[1]

Subsequent developments increased the anxiety of the British Government. In August an Italian Armistice Commission arrived in Beirut; in spite of official disclaimers, its object was generally believed to be to prepare the way for the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the Axis Powers. It was generally unpopular and had little success; by the end of the year it had practically faded out of the picture. More important was the unobtrusive extension of German influence throughout the country; and also the gradual replacement of officials believed to have democratic or pro-British sympathies by others thought to be in agreement with the 'New Order' in France and Europe. In November the High Commissioner himself was recalled and replaced first by M. Chiappe and then, after his death when the aeroplane carrying him to the East was shot down in the

[1] *The Times*, July 2nd, 1941.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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Bishara al-Khouri, became President with the pan-Arab Riyad as-Sulh as Prime Minister; these nationalists were not satisfied with mere titular sovereignty but claimed the reality of independence, and in November 1943 a Free French resort to force against them was reversed only by a British intervention, endorsed by the United States Government. The Free French were thus constrained to transfer most branches of the administration to the Syrian and Lebanese Parliaments, but retained control of the local 'Troupes Spéciales' and obstructed the proper equipping of the Syrian gendarmerie. The French intention was to make this vital concession of authority conditional upon the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty which would give France much the same strategic, economic, and cultural advantages as Britain had retained in Iraq by the already obsolescent Treaty of 1930. In March 1945 Syria and Lebanon had been admitted as sovereign states to membership both of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States. The Syrian nationalists were not prepared to subordinate their sovereignty to an imposed alliance with France, and the landing of a contingent of Senegalese troops immediately after VE-day (in disregard of a personal appeal of Churchill to de Gaulle) was regarded in both Syria and Lebanon as clear evidence of a French resort to coercion. Sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Syrian gendarmerie and the local nationalists on the one hand and the French garrison on the other became general, and when, at the end of May 1945, the local French Commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus the British Government ordered their Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene, by force if necessary, to restore order in a region whose security was vital for British communications in the still-continuing war in the Far East. The crisis accelerated the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, concerning which the demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were supported by the Security Council; the process was completed in Syria by 15 April 1946 and in Lebanon by the end of the year.

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Between the wars, the French Mandate had allowed political development in Lebanon to produce at least a façade of parliamentary democracy, with arrangements between the Muslim and Christian leaders on the division of political power and prerogatives, and the active commercial and intellectual life of Lebanon made progress with a minimum of government interference. In Syria, however, local separatisms which French policy had encouraged made it very difficult for any Syrian Government to knit the people together from Damascus; the